COMMENT
TOTAL DISABILITY BY APPLICATION
OF THE ODD-LOT DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION

Workers' compensation is a system of benefits which protects an
employee, injured in the course of his employment, against wage loss. '
The amount of compensation is computed according to the weekly wage
received at the time of the injury, as well as the nature and extent of the
injury itself.' An injury may be classified as temporary, partial permanent, or total permanent. 3 Total permanent disability payments are
necessitated when an employee, by reason of his injury, can no longer
obtain employment in any well-known branch of the labor market. 4 One
I Naseef v. Cord, Inc., 48 N.J. 317, 325, 225 A.2d 343, 348 (1966); Cureton v. Joma
Plumbing & Heating Co., 38 N.J. 326, 331, 184 A.2d 644, 647 (1962); King v. Western Electric
Co., 122 N.J.L. 442, 448, 5 A.2d 490, 493 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 124 N.J.L. 129, 11 A.2d 32 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1939); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Falcone, 130 N.J. Super. 517, 520,
327 A.2d 699, 701 (Middlesex County Ct. 1974); Electronic Associates Inc. v. Heisinger, 111
N.J. Super. 15, 19-20, 266 A.2d 601, 603 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 57 N.J. 139, 270 A.2d 42
(1970). Workers' compensation benefits also include financial coverage of all necessary medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses, as well as compensation payments to the dependants of
an employee whose injury resulted in death. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15 (West 1959); id. §
34:15-13 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The philosophy underlying workers' compensation law
is that industry and ultimately the consumer must bear the costs incidental to production including injuries to workers. E.g., Renshaw v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 30 N.J. 458,
464-65, 153 A.2d 673, 677 (1959); Gilligan v. International Paper Co., 24 N.J. 230, 235, 131
A.2d 503, 506 (1957); Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 350, 78 A.2d 709, 713 (1951).
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); Everhart v. Newark Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 119 N.J.L. 108, 111, 194 A. 294, 296 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937).
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Temporary disability is
awarded at 66 2/3% of the weekly wages earned at the time of the injury and is to be paid as
long as the disability lasts, up to 300 weeks. Id. § 34:15-12(a). Partial permanent compensation
"[flor disability partial in character and permanent in quality," is granted where there is a
permanent loss of a member of the body or the function of that member. Id. § 34:15-12(c). In
this area, the legislature has provided a specific schedule for various injuries which statei how
long disability will be paid as well as the payment amount. Id. For a discussion of disability
benefits, see generally 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 57.10, at
10-1 to -40 (1976).
4 Katz v. Township of Howell, 67 N.J. 51, 62, 335 A.2d 14. 20 (1975). An award of total
permanent disability is based on 66 2/3% of the weekly salary earned at the time of the accident, subject to a statutory maximum and minimum. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12(b) (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Total permanent disability will be paid for 450 weeks following the
accident, although this period may be extended if the worker is required to, and does, attend
rehabilitation or it otherwise appears that the worker is unable to reattain the level of income
earned at the time of the injury. Id. Furthermore, total disability will be paid where the injury
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method of establishing total disability is through the application of the
5
odd-lot doctrine.
The odd-lot doctrine provides that an employee, although rendered only partially disabled by a work-related injury, may be eligible
to receive an award of total disability. 6 The essence of the doctrine
is that while the injury itself is less than totally debilitating, other
non-medical factors may so combine with the injury as to foreclose
the employee from securing any gainful employment. 7 Under the
odd-lot doctrine, the employee has the burden of proving that his
injury, in conjunction with non-medical factors relating to his education and social background, effectively renders him unemployable in
the labor market. 8 Once an employee presents a prima facie case of
unemployability, the employer may counter the employee's claim by
establishing either that employment is available or that the petitioner
is not appropriately within the ambit of the odd-lot doctrine. 9
In the course of an odd-lot case, the court may be required to
make two separate determinations. 10 At the close of the employee's
case, the employer may request that the court rule, as a matter of
law, whether the petitioner has established those elements necessary
results in "[t]he loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or
any 2 thereof.... Id. at § 34:15-12(c).
5 See Lefelt, Toward A New Method Of Awarding Compensation Benefits: Solving The
Permanent Partial Problem In New Jersey, 28 RUTGERs L. REv. 587, 590-91 (1975).
The term "odd-lot," a rather "undignified phrase," was first used by Lord Judge Moulton in
1911 to describe the awkward position in which an employee finds himself when his injury is
serious enough to hamper his efforts to secure further employment, but not sufficiently serious
to warrant total disability. See Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, [1911] 1 K.B. 1009, 1020-21 (C.A.); A.
LARsON, supra note 3, § 57.51, at 10-119. Justice Cardozo adopted the term from Lord Judge
Moulton in Jordan v. Decorative Co., 230 N.Y. 522, 525-26, 130 N.E. 634, 635-36 (1921). He
described the plight of the odd-lot worker as one who is most often
an unskilled or common laborer [who] coupleLs] his request for employment with
notice that the labor must be light. The applicant imposing such conditions is
quickly put aside for more versatile competitors. Business has little patience with
the suitor for ease and favor ....
Work, if he gets it, is likely to be casual and
intermittent .... Rebuff, if suffered, might reasonably be ascribed to the narrow
opportunities that await the sick and halt.
Id.
6 Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J. 1, 9, 355 A.2d 642, 646 (1976).
7 Id.; see, e.g., Oglesby v. American Dredging Co., 64 N.J. 538, 547-48, 318 A.2d 14, 19
(1974); Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete Inc., 64 N.J. 514, 527-28, 318 A.2d 1, 8 (1974);
Zanchi v. S & K Constr. Co., 124 N.J. Super. 405, 411-12, 307 A.2d 138, 141 (Union County
Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 63 N.J. 331, 307 A.2d 561 (1973).
8 Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 534, 397 A.2d 323, 324
(1979); Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J. 1, 9-10, 355 A.2d 642, 647 (1976).
9 See notes 131-33 infra and accompanying text.
10 Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J. 1, 10, 355 A.2d 642, 647 (1976); see Bradley v.
Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 534, 397 A.2d 323, 324 (1979).
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to present a prima facie case of unemployability."
However, it is
not until presentation of all the evidence that the court must determine, on the record as a whole, whether the employee has proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is unemployable within the
meaning of the odd-lot doctrine. 1 2 Therefore, although a petitioner
might present a primafacie case of unemployability, and an employer
might fail to show that work is available, the petitioner still would not
prevail if he did not establish his case by a preponderance of all the
evidence. 13
In determining whether an employee has established a prima
facie case of unemployability, a court must "decide, on the basis of
[non-medical] evidence and its own common knowledge, whether circumstances unrelated to the accident in question, coupled with the
disability arising from the accident rendered petitioner unemployable." 14 This Comment will examine this standard in light of the
more recent decisions interpreting the odd-lot doctrine; in particular,
it will trace the development of the doctrine so as to clarify the standards applicable to each party.
DEVELOPMENT

The odd-lot classification of injured workers originated in Lord
Judge Moulton's opinion in Cardiff Corp. v. Hall.15 The petitioner
contended that before an employer may obtain an order which reduces a total compensation award, he must establish that not only is
the employee capable of maintaining employment, but also that such
work is available. 16 In response, the court determined that there are
two distinct classes of employees.' 7 For many partially incapacitated
workers, the court noted, an employer need only demonstrate that
fhe employee is capable of pursuing some work in order to negate a

11Germain
12

v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J. 1, 10, 355 A.2d 642, 647 (1976).
Bradley v, Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 534, 397 A.2d 323, 324

(1979).
13 Id.

Zanchi v. S & K Constr. Co., 124 N.J. Super. 405, 410, 307 A.2d 138, 140 (Union
County Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 63 N.J. 331, 307 A.2d 561 (1973) (emphasis added).
15 [1911] 1 K.B. 1009 (C.A.); see Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514,
524, 318 A.2d 1, 6 (1974); Lightner v. Cohn, 76 N.J. Super. 461, 467, 184 A.2d 878, 882 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 611, 186 A.2d 308 (1962); A. lsoN, supra note 3, § 57.51, at
10-119.
16 1 K.B. at 1011-13. Hall had received total disability payments as a result of two separate injuries to his arms. Id. at 1010. Subsequently, however, the employer received an order
which reduced compensation because one arm had so improved that the petitioner was able to
do light work. Id. at 1011.
17 Id. at 1020.
14
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finding of total disability. 18 However, if the injury leaves the worker
without any marketable skills such that he is in the odd-lot of the
labor market, then it is "incumbent" upon the employer to show that
an employment opportunity is present for such an individual.1 9 The
court observed that the prototype odd-lot worker is one whose
"capacities for work [after his accident] fit him only for special uses
and do not, so to speak, make his powers of labour a merchantable
20.
"20
article in some of the well-known lines of the labour market .
Acceptance by the judiciary of Lord Judge Moulton's odd-lot
classification of injured workers was a relatively easy process due to
the broad judicial interpretation of total disability under New Jersey's
statute. 2 1 As such, the odd-lot doctrine may be viewed as a natural
expansion of total disability under the statute. 2 2 New Jersey compensation law strives to compensate the employee according to the

18 Id. The court noted that one who would be considered capable of work despite his injury
might include a mechanical fitter whose business "require[s] a special fineness of touch or keenness of sight so that it can only be done by persons specially gifted in these respects and that it
accordingly commands higher wages." Id. If this individual lost his special expertise such that
he became only an average worker, a court should not require the employer to show the availability of work since he had lost only the ability to "comman[d] higher wages" but not the ability
to work itself. Id.
19 Id. at 1020-21. The court expressed concern that placing the burden of showing the
availability of work on the employer would be unjust in those instances where unemployment is
due to a depressed job market. Id. at 1017-19. However, the court found that if a worker's
condition is such that despite his injury he still possesses sufficient proficiency to be "a merchantable article" in the labor pool, then a court may infer that inability to obtain employment
is due to general economic conditions for which the employer is not responsible. Id. at 1020.
For a discussion of the effect of a depressed job market in relation to the odd-lot doctrine, see
notes 125-29 infra and accompanying text.
20 1 K.B. at 1020-21. The court found that Hall was not in the odd-lot of the labor market
since it was successfully established that he could perform light work. Id. at 1024-25. In this
regard, the court determined that light work was "a well-recognized branch of labour," and the
fact that Hall had been rejected for such positions as watchman and bill deliverer did not negate
completely his capacity to work. Id. at 1025. The court considered these jobs "only specimens
of the work he could do, [and] not the only kind of work within his powers." Id. It was further
stressed that rejection by employers of employees who are found capable of maintaining a job is
not dispositive of a determination as to odd-lot status because the rejections might be due to
high unemployment. Id. at 1018-20. However, the court did note that repeated unsuccessful
attempts to gain employment may be influential in the establishment of an odd-lot case. Id. at
1020. For a discussion of the effect of a search for employment, see notes 109-18 infra.
21 See Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514, 526-27, 318 A.2d 1, 7-8
(1974); Everhart v. Newark Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 119 N.J.L. 108, 111-14, 194 A. 294,
296--98 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937); Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 595-96, 33 A.2d
712, 716-17 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Kalson v. Star Elec. Motor Co., 15 N.J. Super. 565, 573-76, 83
A.2d 656, 660-61 (Essex County Ct. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 21 N.J. Super. 15, 90 A.2d 514
(App. Div. 1952).
22 See Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514, 526-27, 318 A.2d 1, 7-8
(1974).
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injury he has sustained. 23 For purposes of assessing the amount of
an award, disability is said to include any "loss ensuing from personal
injury which detracts from the 'former efficiency' of the workman's
'body or its members in the ordinary pursuits of life."'24 Consequently, it follows that an injured worker, in order to receive total
disability, does not have to show that he is totally helpless or immobile. 2 5 Furthermore, although an injured worker can perform
"'light' or "intermittent" work for remuneration, he will not be precluded from a finding of total disability. 26 In short, the essence of
23 Everhart v. Newark Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 119 N.J.L. 108, 111-12, 194 A. 294, 295-96
(Ct. Err. & App. 1937); see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959) (worker's compensation
provides payment "for personal injuries ... arising out of and in the course of ... employment
. ."). Early. in the history of workers' compensation the Court of Errors & Appeals rejected an
attempt to limit recovery to scheduled injuries. See Everhart v. Newark Cleaning & Dyeing
Co., 119 N.J.L. 108, 194 A. 294 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937). The concept of disability which
prevails in New Jersey has been called both the "whole man" theory and the "earning-capacity"
theory. See A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 57.10, at 10-12 to -15. For a discussion of both
theories, see Lefelt, supra note 5, at 593-95.
24 Everhart v. Newark Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 119 N.J.L. 108, 111, 194 A. 294, 296 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1937). The concern of the legislature that the worker should be indemnified for the
injury received led the court in Everhart to find that "disability" encompasses a disfigurement
of the face even though the actual disability might not directly affect employment skills. Id. at
113-14, 194 A.2d at 298.
25 Riboletti v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 18 N.J. Misc. 219, 12 A.2d 251 (Dept. of
Labor 1940); Hayes v. First Baptist Church of Bloomfield, 18 N.J. Misc. 139, 11 A.2d 417
(Dept. of Labor 1940).
26 Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 595, 33 A.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1943). In
this case, the court found that the petitioner's capacity to perform odd jobs on his farm, and
consequently to generate income, did not negate a finding of total disability. Id. at 594-95, 33
A.2d at 716. The scope of the court's determination, however, was limited to the petitioner's
medical condition which manifested itself in recurring pains and infrequent unconsciousness. Id.
at 593-94, 33 A.2d at 715-16.
Where an injured worker has obtained some casual employment, Larson has pointed out
that he should not be penalized or discouraged by a decrease of his benefits. A. LARSON, supra
note 3, § 57.51, at 10-124. Furthermore, one of the essential factors of an individual's capacity
to sell his services in the job market is the ability to do continuous work. Cleland v. Verona
Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 595, 33 A.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
It is interesting to note that the court in Cleland referred to Cardiff as support for the
principle that light or intermittent employment is not incompatible with total disability. Id. at
595-96, 33 A.2d at 717. Cardiff, by contrast, had held that light work is a "well-recognized
branch of labour" and ability to perform any type of light work will off-set total compensation.
See note 20 supra. These seemingly inconsistent views can be reconciled, however, by acknowledging that the court in Cleland was referring to the odd-lot class of workers, for whom a
demonstration of capacity to do light work would not alter a finding of total disability. Compare
Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 595-96, 33 A.2d 712, 716-17 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
with Cardiff, 1 K.B. at 1020-21. Odd-lot rationale also appeared in the Cleland court's statement that "whether claimant is totally disabled ... is a mixed question of law and fact; and its
determination calls for the exercise of sound judgment and discretion, guided by the statutory
principle, in appraising the circumstances of the particular case." Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc.,
130 N.J.L. 588, 596, 33 A.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1943); see Zanchi v. S & K Constr. Co., 124
N.J. Super. 405, 410, 307 A.2d 138, 140 (Union County Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 63 N.J. 331,
307 A.2d 561 (1973).
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the early decisions defining total disability is that the worker's "in27
juries and their consequences must be viewed as a whole."
In viewing the injured employee as a total working unit, the
court in Rodriguez v. Michael A. Scatuorchio, Inc. 28 enunciated the
basic principles of the odd-lot doctrine in New Jersey. 29 Specifically,
the court found that non-medical factors are as important as the injury itself in assessing total disability. 30 During the course of his
employment, Rodriguez, a sanitation worker, received a serious injury to his arm which resulted in its amputation. 3 1 In awarding total
disability the court delineated a two step procedure. 32 Initially, a
compensation court must look to the petitioner's capacity to work just
prior to the accident z33 Upon examination, the court noted that Rodriguez was born in Puerto Rico and had lived there until the age of
thirty-eight, when he immigrated to the United States. 3 4 He neither
spoke nor understood the English language and his education con-

27 Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 595, 33 A.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1943); see
Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514, 526, 318 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1974). Cf.
Everhart v. Newark Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 119 N.J.L. 108, 114, 194 A. 294, 297-98 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1937) (workers' compensation seeks to mitigate consequences of injury).
Justice Francis in Kalson v. Star Elec. Motor Co., 15 N.J. Super. 565, 83 A.2d 656 (Essex
County Ct. 1951), aff'd, 21 N.J. Super. 15, 90 A.2d 514 (App. Div. 1952), viewed the injury
and its consequences as a whole and found the claimant totally disabled as a result of a knee
injury. 21 N.J. Super. at 576, 83 A.2d at 661. The compensation court had awarded him 50% of
total permanent disability. Id. at 567, 83 A.2d at 656. On appeal, however, Justice Francis
noted that the injury had so affected the petitioner that he was unable to move about without a
cane, and was subjected to great pain whenever the knee was moved. Id. at 576, 83 A.2d at
661. In concluding that petitioner could not compete for employment, the court also considered
the added incapacities that beset Kalson as a result of his 75 years. See id. at 567, 83 A.2d at
657, 659. The Kalson court has been credited with recognizing that total disability may be based
upon a less than totally disabling injury, in conjunction with a non-medical factor. See Ackerman, Justice Francis and Workmen's Compensation, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 458, 475 (1970) (from
historical viewpoint, Kalson may be said to have "spawned" the odd-lot doctrine).
28 42 N.J. Super. 341, 126 A.2d 378 (App. Div. 1956), certif. denied, 23 N.J. 140, 128 A.2d
309 (1957).
29 Id. at 354, 126 A.2d at 384. The court noted that in determining disability a compensation court must examine the total situation surrounding the injured worker. Id. Consequently,
the court said that the employer "took Rodriguez as [he] found him, with all the latent constitutional infirmities which came to the fore and exhibited themselves subsequent to the shattering
experience of having his arm mangled and amputated." Id.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 344, 126 A.2d at 379. He had originally been awarded 100% total permanent
disability but this grant was reduced by the county court. Id.
32 Id. at 345, 354, 126 A.2d at 380, 384.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 345-46, 126 A.2d at 380. The court also noted that prior to the accident Rodriguez
had been an out-going, sociable individual who enjoyed family and friends; however, subsequent to the accident, he became seriously depressed and withdrawn. Id. at 346-47, 126 A.2d
at 380.
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sisted of only the first three grades of elementary school. 35 His work
experience was varied but steady, consisting solely of manual
labor.36 Secondly, in light of this background, the court examined
how the petitioner's injury had affected his ability to achieve the
37
same level of performance he had maintained prior to his accident.
Since Rodriguez's injury involved the loss of his left arm, and his
background limited his job opportunities to manual labor, the court
concluded that he was no longer able to compete in the job market
38
and was therefore entitled to total permanent compensation.
The reasoning enunciated in Rodriguez was further developed in
Lightner v. Cohn. 3 9 The court in Lightner held that when an injured employee is considered unemployable under the odd-lot doctrine, the employer who seeks to challenge this status must "come
forward with proof that work within the capacity of such an employee
is, in fact, within reach." 40 The court regarded this rule as fair to
35 Id. at 345, 126 A.2d at 380.
36 Id. at 345-46, 126 A.2d at 380. From these factors, the court concluded that "[t]he picture of Rodriguez which emerges from the record is that of a normal industrial unit, a nonEnglish speaking, uneducated laborer, hard-working and industrious." Id. at 346, 126 A.2d at
380. For other factors which have aided in establishing odd-lot status, see note 119 infra.
37 42 N.J. Super. at 345, 126 A.2d at 380.
38 Id. at 354, 126 A.2d at 384. The test used by the court to determine whether Rodriguez
was totally disabled was the likelihood that Rodriguez would find a position in a competitive
labor market without the benefit of a sympathetic employer. Id. at 353, 126 A.2d at 384. The
test is essentially an objective one, which requires a court to look at the employee in light of
the realities of the labor market. See Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514,
536, 318 A.2d 1, 13 (1974) (Conford, J.. concurring). As proof of the petitioner's having met this
test, the court noted that Rodriguez had applied to and been rejected by 40 factories. 42 N.J.
Super. at 347, 353, 126 A.2d at 380, 384. In light of these rejections, the court stated that
"[ilnability to get work, traceable directly to the compensable injury, may be as effective in
establishing disability as is inability to perform work." Id. at 353, 126 A.2d at '384. Furthermore, the court emphasized that Rodriguez's work record revealed not only steady employment, but a clear willingness to accept any type of job to earn a living. Id. at 354, 126 A.2d at
384.
39 76 N.J. Super. 461, 184 A.2d 878 (App. Div.), certif denied, 38 N.J. 611, 186 A.2d 308
(1962). The court found the petitioner, Lightner, in the pdd-lot category of workers partially
because of the loss of several fingers on his right hand, and his subsequent neurosis. 76 N.J.
Super. at 463, 184 A.2d at 879. The court likewise considered such background factors as age,
experience, intellect, and lack of emotional stability. Id. at 469, 184 A.2d at 883.
40 Id. at 468, 184 A.2d at 882. According to the court in Lightner, while a petitioner in a
workers' compensation case generally must prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence,
where employability is the issue, the proof thereof "is subject to a 'balanced allocation of
evidentiary responsibility.'" Id. at 469, 184 A.2d at 883. The Lightner court adopted this standard from what it considered an analogous issue; that is, whether the injury arose by accident.
Id. The standard governing whether an injury arose by accident is that:
[w]here expert proof or circumstances warrant an inference that an injury is workconnected, the burden of showing that some other cause, for which the employer is
not responsible, produced the injury is upon the respondent. The burden of production, and perhaps even of persuasion, is upon the employer to show that an
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both the employer and the employee since knowledge of whether the
labor market can offer such an individual employment is more likely
41
available to the employer.
This procedural rule was solidified in Zanchi v. S & K Construction Co. 42 Upon a review of the petitioner's work-related heart attack and other personal handicaps, the Zanchi court made a finding of
total disability.4 3 The court also concluded that Zanchi would not be
denied total disability because he had not sought and been refused
work.4 4 Rather, the court noted, a search for employment is not
necessary so long as there are other circumstances which suggest that
it would be unproductive. 45 With respect to the procedural rule advanced in Lightner, the court reiterated that once an employee supports his contention that he falls within the odd-lot doctrine, the burden of coming forward with evidence of employability shifts to the
employer. 46 The court also stated that the compensation judge is to
make the ultimate determination as to unemployability according to
his "own common knowledge" in light of the medical testimony and
47
the personal circumstances of the claimant.
apparently work-connected injury is the result of the employee's physical condition,
for which an employer is not legally responsible.
Joy v. Florence Pipe Foundry, 64 N.J. Super. 13, 19--20, 165 A.2d 191, 194-95 (App. Div.
1960), certif. denied, 34 N.J. 67, 167 A.2d 55 (1961). The court in Lightner, therefore, found for
the petitioner based partly on the respondent's failure to refute the petitioner's testimony of
unemployability. 76 N.J. at 469, 184 A.2d at 883; see MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE, § 336, at 784 (2d ed. 1972).
" 76 N.J. Super. at 468, 184 A.2d at 882-83. The court stressed that in an odd-lot situation
the employee is hampered not only by the damaging effects of his injury but also by related
neuroses and limited intellectual capacity. Id.; see notes 109-12 infra and accompanying text.
42 124 N.J. Super. 405, 307 A.2d 138 (Union County Ct. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 63 N.J.
331, 307 A.2d 561 (1973).
"' 124 N.J. Super. at 413, 307 A.2d at 142. Those circumstances which the court considered
significant were Zanchi's 60 years of age, his inability to communicate in English, and his lack of
education. Id. Furthermore, the court observed that his employment history was composed
solely of strenuous manual labor, which he could no longer pursue because of his heart attack.
Id.
4 Id. at 411-12, 307 A.2d at 141.
45 Id. at 411, 307 A.2d at 141. The court noted that, as a result of his heart attack, "there is
a question as to whether [Zanchi] ha[s] the physical strength to go out and look frequently or
extensively for a job." Id. at 412, 307 A.2d at 141.
46 Id. at 411, 307 A.2d at 141. With regard to the petitioner's burden, the court stated that
"[t]he petitioner in any workmen's compensation case bears the burden of proving in the first
instance that an award of compensation in a particular amount is probably justified." Id. (emphasis added). When a petitioner in an odd-lot case, however, "produce[s] evidence which
brings him within the ambit of the .. .doctrine," the burden of coming forward with evidence
of employability is then on the employer. Id. The petitioner, however, retains the ultimate
burden of persuasion as to proof of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Bradley v.
Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 534, 397 A.2d 323, 324 (1979).
"7 124 N.J. Super. at 410, 307 A.2d at 140.
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A situation factually similar to Zanchi was considered by the New
Jersey supreme court in Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete,
Inc. 48 Barbato had suffered a work-related heart attack at the age of
sixty for which the compensation judge awarded 33 1/3% of total disability. 4 9 In reversing the lower court's holding and in awarding total
disability, the court incorporated the principles which had been established in Zanchi and Rodriguez. 50 As a fundamental premise, Justice Pashman, writing for the majority, stressed that total disability is
a combined question of law and fact. 5 1 The facts relevant to a determination of unemployability as a matter of law would appear to be
anything which aids in ascertaining a petitioner's position vis-a-vis the
competitive job market. 5 2 Those factors which influenced Justice

48 64 N.J. 514, 318 A.2d 1 (1974). The two cases had actually progressed through the courts
at the same time and an attempt was made to join them. Address by K. H. Wind, What
Constitutes Permanent Total Disability-The "Odd Lot Doctrine," ATLA 1977-1978 Seminar
Series (Dec. 10, 1977). However, the attorney in Zanchi refused this request because of his
success at the county level, in contrast to Barbato, who lost at every level before reaching the
supreme court. Id.
While the supreme court had reviewed odd-lot cases previously, Barbato marked the first
time the Court treated the issue in depth. Id.; see Rodriguez v. Michael A. Scatuorchio, Inc., 42
N.J. Super. 341, 126 A.2d 378 (App. Div. 1956), certif. denied, 23 N.J. 140, 128 A.2d 309
(1957); Zanchi v. S & K Constr. Co., 124 N.J. Super. 405, 307 A.2d 138 (Union County Ct.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 63 N.J. 331, 307 A.2d 561 (1973). The odd-lot doctrine was also approved by the supreme court in Quiles v. New Jersey Metals Co., 37 N.J. 91, 179 A.2d 393
(1962). In Quiles, the court acknowledged such non-medical factors as age, background and
experience in reinstating the lower court's original award of less than 100% of total permanent
disability. Id. at 97, 179 A.2d at 396. However, because it was the employer who had brought
the appeal to the supreme court, and the employee had neglected to crossclaim for a higher
amount than the original award, the supreme court could not find total disability. Id. at 101,
179 A.2d at 398.
49 64 N.J. at 517, 318 A.2d at 2-3. As in Zanchi, the compensation court failed to find total
disability because the petitioner had not sought employment. Id. at 521, 318 A.2d at 5; see
Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 411, 307 A.2d at 141. The compensation judge in Barbato also
noted, some obstinence exhibited by the petitioner "which did not inspire a feeling of total
candor." 64 N.J. at 521, 318 A.2d at 4-5.
50 64 N.J. at 524-30, 318 A.2d at 6-9.
51 Id. at 530, 318 A.2d at 9. The same standard is set forth in both Cleland and Zanchi. See
note 26 supra and text accompanying note 47 supra.
The precise question of law that concerns a court in an odd-lot case is whether the
petitioner, by reason of his personal handicaps, comes within the odd-lot doctrine so as to
warrant total disability. See Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 409-10, 307 A.2d at 140. The factual
consideration involves the question of which elements are relevant in showing unemployability.
Id. at 412-13, 307 A.2d at 142.
52 See 64 N.J. at 527-28, 318 A.2d at 8. Generally, the courts have been quite liberal with
regard to the scope of evidence bearing on the odd-lot issue. See Oglesby v. American Dredging Co., 64 N.J. 538, 544-45, 318 A.2d 14, 17 (1974) (wife testified to petitioner's depression
and change in attitude towards his family); Rodriguez, 42 N.J.. Super. at 346-47, 126 A.2d at
380 (evidence that petitioner's home and social life went from enjoyment to depression and
introversion).
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Pashman to find that Barbato was in the odd-lot category of the labor
market were the claimant's age, his work experience, his inability to
communicate effectively in English, and the nature of his disability. 53 Specifically, the court reasoned that since all of the medical
experts agreed that Barbato could no longer pursue the strenuous
type of work to which he was accustomed, his abilities must be
54
evaluated in light of the skills necessary for more sedentary labor.
Because Barbato did not possess the capacity for this type of work,
the court found him within the ambit of the odd-lot doctrine. 55 Consequently, pursuant to Lightner and Zanchi, the Barbato court concluded that the burden had shifted to the employer, who claimed that
the disability was less than total, to show that work for this individual
56
was available.
In finding Barbato within the ambit of the odd-lot doctrine, the
court was not disturbed by his failure to seek further employment
after his heart attack. 57 Rather, the court adopted the view that in
an odd-lot case, where the facts indicate that a search for employment
would be of no avail, "'motivation is immaterial, because it appears
unlikely that even with the best of motivation could [the individual]
obtain and retain such employment."' 58 Since Barbato's education
53 64 N.J. at 520, 318 A.2d at 4. Barbato at sixty years of age had five years of grammar
school education. Id. His ability to read and write English was limited, and his employment
history consisted mainly of heavy manual labor. Id. While he testified that he had done some
painting of the interior of his home, he was forced to rest during and after the job. Id.
14 See id. at 520, 318 A.2d at 4. Barbato's medical history included a prior coronary, high
blood pressure, and diabetes. Id. at 517, 318 A.2d at 3. Of the two doctors who testified for
Barbato, his family physician admitted that while Barbato could no longer pursue his longshoreman position, he would be fit to work at a desk job. Id. at 520, 318 A.2d at 4. The
respondent's doctor found Barbato 20% disabled and quite capable of maintaining a position in
sales, on an assembly line, or possibly as a security guard. Id. at 519, 318 A.2d at 3-4. With
respect to Barbato's skills, Professor Nawoj, a part owner of a personal service agency, testified
that it would be most unlikely that Barbato would secure employment since he could not fill out
an application form without assistance. Id. at 520, 318 A.2d at 4. Furthermore, he urged that
given Barbato's age, work experience and cardiac condition, employers would be hesitant to
hire him. Id. at 521, 318 A.2d at 4.
55 Id. at 524, 318 A.2d at 6. The court phrased the issue in an odd-lot case as a question of
whether the injury "produced in the workman some incapacity for work over and beyond his
physical disability, personal to himself, which prevent[s] his obtaining employment, such that
the employer's obligation extend[s] to compensation beyond the immediate medical injury." Id.
at 525, 318 A.2d at 7. The court further emphasized that there must be recognition of the
emotional trauma faced by an individual who has worked all his life to support himself, and
now, as a result of that work, finds himself unable to sustain himself. Id. at 530, 318 A.2d at
9-10.
56 Id. at 529-30. 318 A.2d at 9; see Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 469, 184 A.2d at 883;
Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 411, 307 A.2d at 141.
57 64 N.J. at 532-33, 318 A.2d at 10-11.
58 Id. at 532, 318 A.2d at 10-11 (quoting Deaton v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 13 Or. App.
298, 304, 509 P.2d 1215, 1218 (1973)). The court reasoned that in order for an employer to
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did not prepare him for the type of desk work suggested by the respondent, the court reasoned that Barbato's failure to seek a job did
not affect his odd-lot status. 5 9 Furthermore, concern was expressed
that petitioners in general should not be required to endure the oftentimes debasing experience of constant rejection for employment.60
The supreme court's decision in Oglesby v. American Dredging
Co.,61 the companion case to Barbato, is significant because it offers
another factual setting to which the odd-lot doctrine can be
applied. 6 2 The petitioner, Oglesby, injured while lifting a 150-pound
stone, was awarded 37 1/2% partial permanent disability and an additional 12% for an associated neurosis. 63 While the supreme court did
not dispute the amount of compensation based on Oglesby's medical
condition, it did find that, due to non-medical factors, Oglesby was
64
entitled to total permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine.
The circumstances peculiar to the petitioner which influenced the
court were Oglesby's total lack of education, his illiteracy, and the
psychological neurosis which had developed as a result of the accident.65
The New Jersey supreme court again confronted a possible application of the odd-lot doctrine in Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp.6 6 The
court found total disability as a result of a work-related loss of four
fingers of the left hand, viewed in conjunction with the petitioner's
show employability, he must do more than simply assert that the petitioner is physically capable
of doing some form of light work. 64 N.J. at 533, 318 A.2d at 11. Rather, the court charged that
"[i]f the finding [of] 'capacity to perform light work' is to mean anything, there must be some
evidence that light work exists." 64 N.J. at 531 n.2, 318 A.2d at 10 n.2 (quoting Petrone v.
Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 8, 233 A.2d 891, 893 (1967)).
59 64 N.J. at 533, 318 A.2d at 11.
60 Id. The court stressed that it should not have "to wait until such time as Barbato . . .
undergoes a behaviorial neurosis" before it can act. Id. The court was attempting to alleviate
the situation that had occurred to Lightner whose injury had so disfigured his hand that he
suffered great humiliation in applying for work. See id.; text accompanying note 111 infra.
61 64 N.J. 538, 318 A.2d 14 (1974).
62 See id. at 541-43, 547, 318 A.2d at 15-17, 19.
63 Id. at 539, 542, 318 A.2d at 15, 16. Prior to the injury which was the subject of this
appeal, the petitioner suffered two other industrial accidents, one of which resulted in a back
sprain. Id. at 542, 318 A.2d at 16. As a result of his most recent injury, however, he underwent
two separate operations, the second of which was only partially successful. Id. at 543-45, 318
A.2d at 16-17.
Id. at 539, 547-48, 318 A.2d at 14-15, 19.
65 See id. at 541-48, 318 A.2d at 15-19. The medical experts were generally in agreement
that Oglesby was foreclosed from pursuing another job in manual labor, the only field in which
he was experienced. Id. at 545, 318 A.2d at 17. Oglesby attended rehabilitation for four months
where he worked for approximately three hours a day stapling toys onto cardboard. Id at 544,
318 A.2d at 17. However, having to remain seated for this amount of time caused "a drawing
sensation" in his legs which eventually forced him to abandon the rehabilitation center. Id.
66 70 N.J. 1, 355 A.2d 642 (1976).
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inability to speak English. 67 The court also noted that Germain, unlike Barbato, had made ample effort to obtain a job. 68 Germain had
originally been denied total disability because of the compensation
judge's determination that the petitioner had some business experience which could provide a means of support. 69 In response, the
court reaffirmed the principle that occasional work does not refute
70
total disability.
A more important aspect, however, of the court's holding was its
initiation of a notice requirement when alleging application of the
odd-lot doctrine. 7 1 Specifically, a petitioner must declare in his pretrial memorandum his intention to rely on the doctrine. 7 2 Following
the petitioner's case, a respondent may ask the compensation judge
for a ruling as to whether the claimant is prima facie within the oddlot doctrine. 7 3 In this manner, the court noted, a respondent may be
alerted to his "burden of coming forward with proof of employability." 74 Since Germain had not specifically informed his employer of
his intent to rely on the odd-lot doctrine, the case was remanded to
the compensation court. 75 In so doing, the court required that the
compensation court, at the close of the hearing, "weigh and evaluate
all the evidence to determine whether petitioner has sustained his
ultimate burden of proof of permanent total disability." 76
The supreme court recently had the opportunity to re-examine
the functioning of the odd-lot doctrine in Bradley v. Henry Townsend
67 Id. at 3, 8, 355 A.2d at 643, 646. Petitioner was born in Haiti and came to this country a
year before his accident. Id. at 3, 355 A.2d at 643. He was employed in a machine shop when
the accident occurred. Id. In addition to the loss of the use of his hand, Germain suffered a
psychiatric reaction to the deformity which manifested itself in headaches and depression. Id. at
5, 355 A.2d at 644.
68 Id. at 5, 8, 355 A.2d at 644, 646. Germain exhibited a list of more than 30 factories
where he had applied for work. Id. at 5, 355 A.2d at 644.
69 Id. at 6-7, 355 A.2d at 645. The Judge of Compensation decided that since petitioner
owned a business with his mother in Haiti, he had some business connections from which he
made a profit. The supreme court, using the Close rationale, found, however, that there was no
evidence to support this conclusion. Id. at 6, 355 A.2d at 645. For an assessment of the scope of
review, see notes 157-61 infra and accompanying text.
70 70 N.J. at 7-8, 355 A.2d at 646; see Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 33
A.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
71 See 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647.
72 Id. The court noted that such a procedure allows a respondent the opportunity to prepare
his case in light of the odd-lot issue. Id. This procedure should often do away with the necessity
of a remand. See Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 548, 318 A.2d at 19 (case remanded to give employer
chance to meet his burden of showing employability).
73 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647.
74 Id.; see notes 94-95 infra and accompanying text.
75 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647.
76 Id. at 9-10, 355 A.2d at 647 (emphasis added). The effect of these words has been given
two separate interpretations. See notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text.
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Moving & Storage Co. 77 Bradley, the petitioner, injured his back while
lifting a refrigerator with the assistance of two co-workers. 7 8 He was
awarded disability benefits of 60% of total permanent disability but was
denied total disability under the odd-lot doctrine. 79 Although the
petitioner had a limited education, the compensation judge found
",no evidence of a persuasive nature"' which suggested that
Bradley
was unemployable because of his medical condition, viewed in conjunction with other non-medical factors. 8 0 The appellate division
modified this holding, asserting that Bradley's forty-nine years of age,
ninth grade education, and work record of strictly manual labor,
coupled with his injury, compelled application of the odd-lot doctrine.8 1 In noting that Bradley was "at least prima facie" odd-lot, the
court remarked that the employer had not introduced any evidence
82
which would establish that work was available for the petitioner.
83
The court, therefore, awarded total disability.
77 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979).
78 Id. at 533, 397 A.2d at 324. At this time, the petitioner felt pain in his lower back and
right leg and experienced a numbness in his foot. Brief and Appendix for Respondent-Appellant
at 3, Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as brief for Respondent-Appellant]. He was hospitalized the following day,
where he remained for two weeks. Id. He returned to the hospital two months later for ten
days, was released, and then confined again one month later at which time he underwent an
operation for "two resultant herniated discs ... which was only partially successful." 78 N.J. at
533, 397 A.2d at 324. The petitioner complained of being in constant pain for which he took
medication, and testified that he must use a back support and cane. Brief for PetitionerAppellee at 4, Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner-Appellee].
79 78 N.J. at 533, 397 A.2d at 324. Respondent's medical experts considered Bradley's "orthopedic disability" at 20% of total while petitioner's experts found him totally disabled because
of "orthopedic and neurological factors." Id.
80 Id. at 534-35, 397 A.2d at 325. The compensation court questioned Bradley's credibility
with respect to his need for a cane and his motivation to seek employment since he was receiving $319 in social security disability benefits as well as workers' compensation benefits. Id.; see
notes 142-44 infra and accompanying text.
81 Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 164 N.J. Super. 466, 469, 473, 397
A.2d at 335, 336-37, 339 (App. Div. 1978), modified, 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979). The court
also relied on the testimony of a psychologist who tested Bradley and found him to be within
the "dull-normal range" of intelligence with a fifth grade aptitude level. 164 N.J. Super. at 470,
397 A.2d at 337. In addition, the court noted that Bradley began working at the age of nine or
ten doing strenuous manual labor. 164 N.J. Super. at 469, 397 A.2d at 336-37.
82 Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 164 N.J. Super. 466, 472, 397 A.2d
335, 338 (App. Div. 1978), modified, 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979). Although the pretrial
memorandum was filed six weeks after the decision in Germain, it did not contain any reference
to the odd-lot doctrine. Id. at 474, 397, A.2d at 339. However, Judge Pressler stated that since
the record of the proceeding indicated that the respondent knew that odd-lot status was at
issue, it was his responsibility to request an odd-lot ruling at the close of the petitioner's case.
Id.; see Gernain, 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647.
83 Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 164 N.J. Super. 466, 473, 397 A.2d
335, 339 (App. Div. 1978), modified, 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979).
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On appeal the supreme court modified the lower court's decision, holding that the compensation judge's decision was based on
sufficient credible evidence and could not therefore be overturned by
an appellate court when it reviews the evidence de novo.8 4 In this
regard, the Bradley court alluded to the petitioner's military experience as a platoon sergeant.8 5 The court also gave deference to the
compensation judge's determination that Bradley's motivation to seek
work was somewhat nebulous due to the substantial benefits he was
receiving from social security. 86 It was likewise stressed that pursuant to Germain, "the ultimate burden of proof in an odd-lot case is
upon the petitioner." 87 Therefore, the court emphasized, an
employer might offer no evidence of employability, and still prevail
because the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of persuasion by
88
a preponderance of the evidence.
In a strong dissent, Justice Pashman urged that the appellate division had acted appropriately in applying the odd-lot doctrine. 89 He
78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324. The court observed that the compensation judge's findings were "fully supportable in the record," and while "[t]he evidence was conflicting, ...
established law requires that due deference be given to the judge who heard the witnesses and
had the feel of the case." Id. at 535, 397 A.2d at 325. Furthermore, the court noted that the
appellate division had acted outside the limits of its review power in its application of the
odd-lot doctrine where the compensation judge chose otherwise. Id. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324;
see Close v. Kordulak, 44 N.J. 589, 210 A.2d 753 (1965); notes 158-61 infra and accompanying
text.
85 See 78 N.J. at 533-34, 397 A.2d at 324. A psychologist who testified for the petitioner did
admit that this experience was " 'puzil[ing]' " in view of the results of the tests he had given to
the petitioner. See Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 78, at 7.
86 78 N.J. at 535, 397 A.2d at 325; see note 80 supra.
87 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324; see note 76 supra and accompanying text. In effect, the
majority is saying that a prima facie case of unemployability is not necessarily proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324. If a petitioner is going to prevail
he must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The standard in a workers'
compensation case is generally proof by a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Cuiba v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 138-40, 141 A.2d 761, 766-68 (1958); Lightner,
76 N.J. Super. at 468, 184 A.2d at 883; Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 411, 307 A.2d at 141. Proof
by a preponderance of the evidence has been defined as being met where "the existence of the
contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence." McCoRMICK, supra note 40, at 794.
According to Justice Pashman the proof by a preponderance standard comes into effect only
where the respondent has introduced evidence of employability. Bradley, 78 N.J. at 537, 397
A.2d at 326. (Pashman, J., dissenting).
88 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324. The court in Germain had stated that the ultimate
burden of proof in an odd-lot case is on the petitioner. Germain, 70 N.J. at 9, 355 A.2d at 647.
However, it also said that after a petitioner makes out a prima facie case, "[u]nless the employer
comes forward with proof that employment . . . is available for the petitioner the Judge of
Compensation upon reviewng the entire record will be justified in rendering an award of total
and permanent disability." Id. at 9, 355 A.2d at 646-47 (emphasis added). The effect of the
majority's view is, in the opinion of Justice Pashman, to cast doubt on the continued viability of
the Germain decision. See 78 N.J. at 538, 397 A.2d at 326 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
89 See id. at 535, 397 A.2d at 325.

1978]

COMMENT

further stated that the majority had "misconstrued Germain" with regard to the relative burdens allocated to each party in an odd-lot
case. 90 In support of this position, he argued that a prima facie case
of unemployability shifts to the respondent the burden of coming
forward with evidence of employability, effectively creating a presumption as to that fact. 9 1 Should the employer fail to meet this
burden, he added, there must be a determination against him on that
issue. 92 Furthermore, while Justice Pashman agreed with the statement in Germain that the employee has the ultimate burden of proof,
he argued that it is only when the employer has introduced substantial evidence of employability that "the burden of proof comes into
effect and the compensation judge, in order to hold for the petitioner,
must find that the petitioner has established his unemployability by
93
the preponderance of the evidence."
Justice Pashman also supported his contention with a reference
to the procedure announced in Germain which permits an employer
to request that the judge determine, at the end of the petitioner's
case, whether the petitioner is prima facie unemployable. 94 Justice
Pashman asserted that there could be no reason for providing such a
procedure other than to communicate to the employer that the burden of coming foward with evidence of employability has shifted to
him.

95

90 78 N.J. at 538, 397 A.2d at 326-27.
91 Id. at 535-36, 397 A.2d at 326. Justice Pashman noted that there are two meanings of the

term "primafacie." Id. at 536 n. 1, 397 A.2d at 325 n. 1. The more common use of the term is

where a petitioner or plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to prevent a directed verdict
against him as to the fact in question. Id. It is in this sense that the majority has used the term.
See id. However, Justice Pashman urged that prima facie in an odd-lot case refers to a sufficient
amount of evidence "to warrant what may be called a presumption of that fact." Id.; MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at 784.
92 78 N.J. at 537, 397 A.2d at 325. This statement is in accord with the general rule that
where "'the presumption is validly invoked, the opponent of the fact to be presumed must
produce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, or risk a peremptory finding against
him.' " Id. at 537 n.2, 397 A.2d at 326 n.2 (quoting N.J.R. EVID., COMMENT SEC. 1(5)-1). See
MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at 784.
93 78 N.J. at 537, 397 A.2d at 326. This opinion is consistent with the generally held view
on the burden of persuasion. MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at 784. McCormick states that
[the burden of persuasion becomes a crucial factor only if the parties have sustained their burdens of producing evidence and only when all of the evidence has
been introduced. It does not shift from party to party during the course of the trial
simply because it need not be allocated until it is time for a decision. Id.
9 78 N.J. at 538, 397 A.2d at 326 (Pashman, J., dissenting); see 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at
647.
95 78 N.J. at 537-38, 397 A.2d at 326 (Pashman, J., dissenting). In light of the majority's
reasoning, Justice Pashman found that the procedure in Germain loses any significance. See
note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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PRESENTING AN ODD-LOT CASE

A petitioner must affirmatively state in his pretrial memorandum
that he intends to rely on the odd-lot doctrine. 96 Upon notice of the
odd-lot doctrine from the pretrial memorandum, a respondent may
request, at the close of the petitioner's case, that the judge determine
97
whether the petitioner is prima facie within the odd-lot doctrine.
While this ruling may be in the affirmative, a petitioner must still
prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 98
The most concise statement of the substantive requirements of
total disability under the odd-lot doctrine appears in Germain. There
the court stated:
if, because of handicaps personal to the worker over and above the
limitations on work capacity directly produced by his accidental injury, he is unemployable on a regular basis in a reasonably stable
job market, he is to be considered totally disabled for workmen's
compensation purposes. 99
The sine qua non of any workers' compensation recovery is that
there have been a work-related injury, "arising out of and in the
course of . . . employment ..
"100 The most common types of in-

9'

Germain, 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647.

97 Id. Where the respondent receives no notice of the possible application of the odd-lot

doctrine, and therefore does not request an odd-lot ruling, the case will be remanded to the
compensation court for a hearing on the issue of employability. Kovach v. General Motors
Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 546, 552-54, 384 A.2d 847, 850 (App. Div. 1977). However, in Bradley
the appellate division found that the respondent had notice that the odd-lot doctrine was at
issue during the trial, despite the fact that the petitioner had not stated his intent to rely on the
doctrine in the pretrial memorandum. Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 164
N.J. Super. 466, 474, 397 A.2d 335, 339, modified, 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979); see note
82 supra.
98 Bradley, 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324. Justice Pashman has suggested that "the majority's interpretation of Germain would render nugatory th[is] procedure." Id. at 538, 397 A.2d at
326 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
9 Germain, 70 N.J. at 9, 355 A.2d at 646.
100 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959); see, e.g., Thornton v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp.,
62 N.J. 235, 238, 300 A.2d 146, 147 (1972). Crooms v. Central Steel Drum, however, presents a
unique variation on the requirement of a work-related injury before the odd-lot doctrine can be
applied. See Crooms v. Central Steel Drum, 156 N.J. Super. 471, 384 A.2d 155 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 77 N.J. 493, 391 A.2d 508 (1978). The petitioner had been compensated on five
previous occasions for occupational illnesses which were related to his employment as a
sandblaster of empty drums. 156 N.J. Super. at 474-75, 384 A.2d at 156-57. He was finally laid
off due to continual absence from work necessitated by frequent trips to the doctor. Id. Following his layoff, he filed a sixth petition for an aggravated heart condition for which he received an
additional 5% of total permanent disability. Id. His seventh petition, the subject of the appeal,
was not based on any injury or aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Id. at 475, 384 A.2d at
157. Rather, it sought total permanent disability because the previous injuries and illnesses had
foreclosed his continuing as a manual laborer, the only work for which he was qualified. Id.
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juries giving rise to application of the odd-lot doctrine in New Jersey
have thus far been heart attacks and the loss of a member or function
of a member of the body. 10 1 The effects of such injuries can be
presented through both lay and expert testimony.10 2 Expert testimony may include medical opinions as well as observations by
employment experts. 103 A medical expert is given great latitude for he
may testify not only as to the quantum of the disability but also as to
the effect of the disability on the petitioner as a working unit.104 In
the situation where there is conflicting evidence among the medical
experts, the courts will give greater weight to the testimony of the
treating physician. 10 5 Furthermore, a court will not look favorably
on the testimony of an employer's expert who has not examined the
petitioner's total physical condition, or who has not taken the
petitioner's personal characteristics into consideration in estimating
06
the extent of disability.1
Judge Pressler, in applying the odd-lot doctrine, reasoned that since the "petitioner lost his job
because the physical demands which that job had imposed upon him for nearly twenty years
finally left him physically unfit to perform it any longer," the job should compensate him accordingly. Id. at 478, 384 A.2d at 158-59.
101 See Germain, 70 N.J. at 3, 355 A.2d at 643 (loss of parts of four fingers); Barbato, 64 N.J.
at 517, 318 A.2d at 2 (heart attack); Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 463, 184 A.2d at 879 (loss of
four fingers of right hand); Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 344, 126 A.2d at 379 (loss of left arm);
Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 408-09, 307 A.2d at 139 (heart attack). Back injuries have also been
the basis for application of the odd-lot doctrine although the treatment is less consistent. See
Bradley, 78 N.J. at 333, 397 A.2d at 324 (odd-lot status denied); Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 539, 318
A.2d at 14 (total disability); Quiles v. New Jersey Metals Co., 37 N.J. 91, 93, 179 A.2d 393, 394
(1962) (odd-lot doctrine rationale applied to back injury).
102 Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 544-47, 318 A.2d at 17-19; see note 52 supra.
103 See Germain, 70 N.J. at 4-5, 355 A.2d at 644; Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 545-48, 318 A.2d at
17-18; Lightner, 76 N.J. Super at 464-65, 184 A.2d at 880-81. In Barbato, the court relied on
the testimony of a professor of Industrial Relations and part owner of a "personal service
agency" in establishing unemployability. Barbato, 64 N.J. at 520-21, 530-31, 318 A.2d at 4, 10.
The court also took judicial notice of the fact that while the expert's experience was in an urban
area of the state, his assessment was still valid for a more residential community. Id. at 531, 318
A.2d at 10. In Bradley, the petitioner offered the testimony of various experts in vocational
rehabilitation, which testimony included the results of aptitude and intelligence tests. 164 N.J.
Super. at 470-71, 397 A.2d at 337, modified, 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979).
104 See Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 545-47, 318 A.2d at 17-19; Barbato, 64 N.J. at 519-21, 318 A.2d
at 3-4; Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 464-65, 184 A.2d at 880; Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at
347-48, 126 A.2d at 381. But see Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 410, 307 A.2d at 140 (testimony as
to employability beyond scope of doctor's expertise).
105 E.g., Pellegrino v. Monahan McCann Stone Co., 61 N.J. Super. 561, 577, 162 A.2d 97,
106 (App. Div.) aff'd, 33 N.J. 73, 162 A.2d 109 (1960); Mewes v. Union Bldg. & Constr. Co.,
45 N.J. Super, 88, 94, 131 A.2d 561, 564 (App. Div.). certif. denied, 24 N.J. 546, 133 A.2d 395
(1957). In Lightner, the court pointed out that conflicting medical testimony indicates nothing
more than the "inexactness and uncertainty in the application of medical science to humanistic
problems." 76 N.J. Super. at 464, 184 A.2d at 880; see Barbato, 64 N.J. at 529, 318 A.2d at 9.
106 Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 348-49, 126 A.2d at 381. In Lightner, the respondent had
unsuccessfully argued that because more than half of the six medical experts who testified found
that the petitioner's disability did not exceed 25% of total, a finding of total disability was "ipso
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The psychological ramifications of a particular injury play a significant part in establishing total disability under the odd-lot doctrine. 10 7

Primarily, psychological trauma, as a consequence of an in-

jury, may itself be directly compensable under the statute. 10 8 In an
odd-lot case, however, the courts may also look to the psychological
results of an injury to determine Whether a petitioner need establish
that he actively sought employment. 10 9 For example, in Lightner
the petitioner had made some minimal attempts to obtain employment. 1 10 During such attempts, however, the employers who interviewed Lightner told him he must be "crazy," to think he could
obtain a position with his deformed hand."' The humiliation and embarassment which Lightner suffered as a result of such encounters
caused the court to find that, while the effort Lightner had made was
minimal, he should not be subjected to any further similar experiences before being awarded total disability. 112 It appears, therefore,
that where one's injury results in a physical deformity, the court may

be influenced not to force the individual to undergo the further emotional strain associated with seeking employment.
As yet, no decisions in New Jersey have denied total disability
3
under the odd-lot doctrine for a petitioner's failure to seek work."1
Nevertheless, numerous petitioners have been challenged as to their
motivation in seeking total disability where they have not sought
employment. 1 14 While the general rule that emerges from these
cases is that no "undue reliance" will be placed upon a failure to
solicit another job, 1 15 one's motivation in seeking total disability is not
facto excessive." 76 N.J. Super. at 465, 184 A.2d at 881. In response, the court noted that
disability is not applied according to a "precise formula" because it does not admit to a
mathematical or scientific rule. Id. at 465-66, 184 A.2d at 881.
107 See e.g., Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 544-45, 318 A.2d at 17; Crooms v. Central Steel Drum, 156
N.J. Super. 471, 475-76, 384 A.2d 155, 157 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 493, 391 A.2d
508 (1978); Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 469, 184 A.2d at 883; Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 346,
126 A.2d at 380.
' Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 539, 318 A.2d at 15; Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 463, 184 A.2d at 879.
109See Barbato, 64 N.J. at 533, 318 A.2d at 11; Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 463, 184 A.2d at
880; Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 347, 126 A.2d at 380.
110 Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 463, 184 A.2d at 880; see Barbato, 64 NJ. at 533, 318 A.2d at
11. Subsequent to his injury, Lightner had made three inquiries regarding employment. 76 N.J.
Super. at 463, 184 A.2d at 880.
...76 N.J. Super. at 463, 184 A.2d at 880. He reported that "'[w]hen I go, they look at my
hand and turn around and laugh."' Id.
112

Id.

1'3See Barbato, 64 N.J. at 533, 318 A.2d at 11; Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 411-12, 307 A.2d
at 141.
114 Barbato, 64 N.J. at 533, 318 A.2d at 880; Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 411-12, 307 A.2d at
141.
115Barbato, 64 N.J. at 532, 318 A.2d at 10.
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above query. 116 Furthermore, evidence that a claimant sought and
was refused employment will be relevant in assessing unemployability. 117 In Germain, for example, the court relied on petitioner's
list of more than thirty factories where he had unsuccessfully sought
work. 118
Other factors which the courts have considered in applying oddlot status to a petitioner include age, education, work experience,
intelligence, and ability to communicate in English. 1 19 In appraising
these qualities, the courts have not weighed one element more than
another, but rather have looked to how one or more of the characteristics has affected the individual as a working unit. 120 As such, the
116Bradley, 78 N.J. at 534-35, 397 A.2d at 325. In Bradley, there is a suggestion that had
the petitioner displayed an effort to seek employment and been rejected, there might have
been a different result. See id. In this regard the compensation judge pointed out that Bradley
was already receiving disability benefits from Social Security, and would receive something from
workers' compensation and had "show[n] no motivation to get work." Id. One commentator has
noted that since an award of total disability is much higher than one of partial disability, "there
is great economic incentive to seek" total disability. Kumpf, Unemployability And The Odd Lot
Doctrine In Workers' Compensation, 102 N.J.L.J. 2, 2 (1978). Furthermore, he warns that
when total disability payments are coupled with Social Security Disability Benefits, the payments are quite attractive, and consequently, there is a danger that the workers' compensation
courts will be inundated with petitioners trying "to take a shot at showing unemployability." Id.
117 Germain, 70 N.J. at 8,355 A.2d at 646; Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 347, 126 A.2d at
380.
118Germain, 70 N.J. at 5, 8, 355 A.2d at 644, 646.
119E.g., Germain, 70 N.J. at 8, 355 A.2d at 646 (communication barrier); Oglesby, 64 N.J. at
520, 318 A.2d at 15 (age and lack of education); Barbato, 64 N.J. at 520, 318 A.2d at 4 (age and
minimal education); Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 469, 184 A.2d at 883 (age, disfigurement, and
emotional instability); Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 345-46, 126 A.2d at 380 (communication
barrier, minimal education, and lack of vocational training); Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 423, 307
A.2d at 142 (age, communication barrier, minimal education, and lack of vocational training).
120 See Kumpf, supra note 116, at 23. Judge Kumpf indicates that the circumstances of
unemployability are all relative:
1. Age-The older a worker is, the more difficulty he will experience in finding employment.
2. General Background-This provides a framework within which to evaluate
(within common knowledge) the likelihood of finding employment.
3. Employment Experience-The more limited the experience, the more difficulty finding employment. (So that to one accustomed to heavy manual labor,
disability was found where only intermittent or sedentary work was available).
4. Vocational Training-The less training the more difficult it will be to overcome handicaps.
5. Educational Level-The less education, the less likely reemployment becomes.
6. Intellectual Capacity-The greater the capacity, the wider the fields of
reemployment and the better the ability to overcome handicaps.
7. Facility With the English Language-A non-English speaking disabled
worker is less likely to find reemployment.
8. Physical Debility-Any additional infirmities further reduce the likelihood
of reemployment of an injured worker.
Id. (footnote and emphasis omitted).
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relevance of any particular handicap seems only to be bound by
whether it has an effect, if any, upon the ability of an individual to
function in the labor market.' 2 1 Furthermore, it is not the quantity
of factors which is important, but rather the peculiar effect that even
one factor may work on an individual.' 2 2 In Germain, aside from his
injury, the petitioner was handicapped by his inability to speak English.12 3 The court considered this combination sufficient to warrant
total disability. 124
Finally, the worker must be unemployable "in a reasonably stable job market." 125 The essence of this requirement is that
unemployability must be due to the particular circumstances of the
individual and not an overall depressed job market. 126 It is apparent, however, that once odd-lot status attaches, the court will accept
that unemployability resulted from one's handicaps and not a high
unemployment rate. 12 7 The requirement of a reasonably stable job
market also works to the advantage of an employee who, after his
injury, is hired for a short time during a prosperous period and then
dismissed. 128 In such a case, an employer should not be permitted
to benefit from a business boom to show employability, because a
handicapped person hired under these circumstances will be the first
129
to be discharged.

121 See note 52 supra.

122 See Germain, 70 N.J. at 9, 355 A.2d at 646. The court concluded that Germain's language
barrier, coupled with the deformed condition of his hand, were sufficient to support application
of the odd-lot doctrine. Id.
123

Id.

Id.
125 Id. at 9, 355 A.2d at 646.
126 See Crooms v. Central Steel Drum Co., 156 N.J. Super. 471, 477-78, 384 A.2d 155,
158-59 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 493, 391 A.2d 508 (1978). Judge Kumpf has stressed
that where unemployment is high, it is up to the lawyers and judges of the compensation court
to "separat[e] those cases where the petitioner is able to work but for economic reasons has not
been able to find work in the high unemployment market, from those cases where the
petitioner is 'unemployable on a regular basis in a reasonably stable labor market.'" Kumpf,
supra note 116, at 2 (quoting Germain, 70 N.J. at 9, 355 A.2d at 646).
In Crooms v. Central Steel Drum, Judge Pressler found a reasonably stable job market
existed in Newark because there had been no marked change in the high rate of unemployment
which prevailed there for six years prior to the petitioner's award. 156 N.J. Super. 471, 478,
384 A.2d 155, 159 (App. Div.), certif denied, 77 N.J. 493, 391 A.2d 508 (1978).
127 See Crooms v. Central Steel Drum Co., 156 N.J. Super. 471, 478, 384 A.2d 155, 159
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 493, 391 A.2d 508 (1978).
s2' See A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 57.51, at 10-119.
129 Kumpf, supra note 116, at 23; see Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 353, 126 A.2d at 384.
124
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DEFENSE IN AN ODD-LOT CASE

Once an employer is on notice that the odd-lot doctrine is at
issue, 130 it is his responsibility to request a ruling at the close of the
petitioner's case as to whether the petitioner has established a prima
facie case of unemployability.131 If the court rules affirmatively, the
employer may seek to establish employability in either of two ways.
First, he may present evidence to impugn the employee's odd-lot
status so as to prevent an ultimate determination of unemployability. 13 2 Second, the employer may introduce evidence that would indicate that the claimant, despite his handicaps, is an employable
unit. 133

Where the employer chooses the first approach, he may assert
that the petitioner is a malingerer who has voluntarily withdrawn
from the labor market. The courts of New Jersey have repeatedly
stressed that they will not countenance such action by awarding total
disability. 13 4 Malingering is essentially a question of credibility,
which goes to the veracity of the claimant's testimony concerning his
injury and its effect.' 3 5 In addition to testimony, one means of demonstrating a possible exaggeration of the effect of an injury is

130 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.

131 Germain, 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647; see Bradley-v. Henry Townsend Moving &
Storage Co., 164 N.J. Super. 466, 474, 397 A.2d at 335, 339 (App. Div. 1978), modified, 78
N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979).
132 See Bradley, 78 N.J. at 534-35, 397 A.2d at 324-25. Factors which influenced the compensation judge in Bradley not to find odd-lot status were receipt of social security benefits, and
lack of total credibility in the seriousness of the effects of Bradley's injury. See id. Even according to Justice Pashman's view that a prima facie case of unemployability creates a presumption
of that fact, such evidence would be permissible. 21 C. WRIGHT & X. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5125, at 601-02. The authors state that "[t]he party against
whom the presumption operates may choose to respond by attacking the existence of the basic
fact, by introducing evidence which is contrary to the presumed fact, or both." Id.
3 See notes 152-55 infra and accompanying text.
l Barbato, 64 N.J. at 529, 318 A.2d at 9; Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 468, 184 A.2d at 883;
Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 354, 126 A.2d at 384; Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L.
588, 593, 33 A.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 413, 307 A.2d at 142.
'15 See Watts v. City of Newark, 25 N.J. Misc. 402, 407, 54 A.2d 622, 625 (Ct. Ch. 1947).
Specifically, the court described.the issue of malingering as a question of whether the individual
is "telling [or] acting the truth." Id. The court also stressed that determination of this question
is for the trier of fact, who has the opportunity to observe the witness. Id. The court noted that
malingering will not be found on appeal unless the record indicates per se that a contrary
conclusion is warranted. Id. Malingering has also been described as an exaggeration of one's
injuries. Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 593, 33 A.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
Malingering in an odd-lot case arises where a petitioner "voluntarily withdraws from the [labor]
market." Barbato, 64 N.J. at 529, 318 A.2d at 9; see Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 468, 184 A.2d
at 883; Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 354, 126 A.2d at 384.
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through the use of films. 136 While in the past, films have been considered untrustworthy and misleading because they often do not accurately depict the petitioner and his activities, 1 37 they should be
38
admissible if relevant and properly authenticated. 1
A closely allied issue, one's motivation in seeking total disability, 139 however, has become more important. Lack of a proper motivation may, in some cases, be illustrated by a petitioner's failure to
seek employment.1 4 0 For example, if the underlying injury and its
130

See Balian v. General Motors Corp., 121 N.J. Super. 118, 125, 296 A.2d 317, 320 (App.

Div. 1972), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 195, 299 A.2d 729 (1973); Hayes v. First Baptist Church of

Bloomfield, 18 N.J. Misc. 139, 11 A.2d 417 (Dept. of Labor 1940).
137Riboletti v. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., 18 N.J. Misc. 219, 221, 12 A.2d 251,
253 (Dept. of Labor 1940). In Riboletti, the deputy commissioner insinuated that while the films
showed continuous activity on the part of the petitioner, they were misleading because they did
not allow for the time intervals between the activities. Id. Furthermore, the commissioner
found that in weighing the films against the medical testimony, the medical testimony was
stronger and more reliable. Id.
138Balian v. General Motors Corp., 121 N.J. Super. 118, 125, 296 A.2d 317, 320-21 (App.
Div. 1972), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 195, 299 A.2d 729 (1973). To authenticate a film one must
present:
(1) evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the taking of the film; (2) the
manner and circumstances surrounding the development of the film; (3) evidence in
regard to the projection of the film; and (4) testimony by a person present at the
time the motion pictures were taken that the pictures accurately depict the events
as he saw them when they occurred.
Balian, 121 N.J. Super. at 125, 296 A.2d at 320-21.
139 Kumpf, supra note 116, at 2. Both motivation and malingering are credibility questions,
and involve essentially the same issue-has the petitioner voluntarily withdrawn from the labor
market. Compare Bradley, 78 N.J. at 534-35, 397 A.2d at 324-25 with Barbato, 64 N.J. at 529,
318 A.2d at 9.
140 See Barbato, 64 N.J. at 532, 318 A.2d at 10-11 (no "undue reliance [should] be placed on
petitioner's supposed lack of motivation in not actively seeking employment") (emphasis added);
Deaton v. State Indus. Ins. Fund, 13 Or. App. 298, 304-05, 509 P.2d 1215, 1218 (1973) (motivation is relevant unless injuries are so severe, that regardless of motivation, individual is unemployable). The Oregon rule provides:
(1) motivation is not necessary to establish a prina facie case of odd-lot status if the
medical facts when considered along with other factors, such as age, education,
mental capacity and training of themselves support the claimed inability to work
[but] (2) evidence of motivation to seek and work at gainful employment is necessary to establish a prima facie case of odd-lot status if the injuries, even though
severe, are not such that the trier of fact can say that regardless of motivation this
man is not likely to be able to engage in gainful and suitable employment.
Id. at 304-05, 509 P.2d at 1218. The distinction appears to depend on the seriousness of the
injury, and upon the determination of whether there were present any factors which might
suggest an improper motivation. See id. at 304-05, 509 P.2d at 1218. With respect to this issue
the court found that while Deaton's rib fractures were severe, his motivation had been challenged. Id. at 302-05, 509 P.2d at 1217-18. In particular, the testimony of a psychiatrist indicated that Deaton lacked motivation to obtain employment because his compensation benefits
were commensurate with what he could earn in the labor market. Id.
Examples of other factors that have necessitated an examination of motivation include a
statement by a psychiatrist that the claimant had adjusted to his condition and did not wish to
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effect are not sufficiently serious to suggest that a search for employ14 1
ment would be unproductive, the court may deny total disability.
Similarly, improper motivation may be evinced where the claimant is
already receiving other benefits and merely wants to supplement this
income. 14 2 In Bradley, the compensation judge found that the
petitioner was already receiving workers' compensation benefits and
$319 a month from Social Security Disability funds. 1 4 3 Consequently, there is the suggestion that he considered Bradley's claim
of total disability a pretense for augmenting his already steady income. 144
An employer might also challenge odd-lot status where the
claimant lacks a steady work record. A review of odd-lot cases indicates some reliance by the courts on a petitioner's employment history. 14 5 In Rodriguez, in particular, the court stressed that in applying the odd-lot doctrine the compensation court must compare the
14 6
worker before the injury with his condition after the accident.

pursue rehabilitation. Haines v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 27 Or. App. 793, 798, 558 P.2d 367,
369 (1976). Similarly, 60 year old claimant was required to show that he sought employment

because the compensation board found that the effect of his injury was "mildly moderate." Price
v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 25 Or. App. 369, 373, 549 P.2d 533, 535 (1976). The court was
also influenced by the fact that the petitioner was receiving social security benefits. Id. Finally,
the Oregon court has questioned motivation where the injury was limited to a "compression
fracture of [the] LI lumbar vertebra" which the court denoted as not "sufficiently severe" to
warrant overlooking motivation. Kirkendall v. Stamper's J. & J. Tire Co., 18 Or. App. 56, 57,
61, 523 P.2d 1052, 1053, 1055 (1974). While these cases indicate that the motivation standard
has been widely used, it has also not gone without criticism. See Wilson v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,
30 Or. App. 403, 567 P.2d 567 (1977). In Wilson the court stated that the Deaton rule "tend[s]
to cause motivation to be treated inappropriately as the thing to be proved rather than as
evidence of something else." Id. at 408, 567 P.2d at 572.
141 See Barbato, 64 N.J. at 532-33, 318 A.2d at 11-12; Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 411, 307
A.2d at 141. In Zanchi, in particular, the court stressed that proof of unsuccessful attempts to
seek employment is unnecessary so long as there are "other circumstances [which would] indicate that the search ...would probably be fruitless." 124 N.J. Super. at 411, 307 A.2d at 141.
Barbato's condition was also serious in light of his age, 60, and the fact that he had suffered a
coronary in 1962, as well as the "moderately severe" heart attack which was the basis of his
compensation award. See 64 N.J. at 517-18, 318 A.2d at 2-3. Similarly, in Zanchi, the court
found that the petitioner's condition was such that job hunting could have been detrimental to
his health. See 124 N.J. Super. at 412, 307 A.2d at 141.
142 Bradley, 78 N.J. at 535, 397 A.2d at 325; see Price v. State Accident Fund, 25 Or. App.
369, 373-74, 549 P.2d 533, 536 (1976).
143 Bradley, 78 N.J. at 535, 397 A.2d at 325.
144 Id. It has also been noted that the economic advantage of total disability as compared to a
partial award, "combined with .. .the seemingly easy availability of Social Security Disability
Benefits, creates a situation in which an ever-increasing number of cases will raise th[e] issue of
odd-lot employability." Kumpf, supra, note 116, at 2.
14'Germain, 70 N.J. at 8, 355 A.2d at 646; Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 354, 126 A.2d at
380.
146 Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 345, 126 A.2d at 380.
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The court observed that, prior to his injury, Rodriguez was "a normal
industrial unit, . . . hard-working and industrious." 147 By way of
contrast, therefore, it would appear that a worker who has been unemployed for a length of time before the employment wherein he was
injured, should be required to demonstrate that his unemployability
is a result of his post-injury circumstances, and not a continuation of
the pattern that had preexisted his injury.
The type of work a claimant has pursued may be equally relevant
in determining odd-lot status. Oglesby, in particular, illustrates the
principle that the odd-lot doctrine is applicable solely to manual
laborers whose skills and experience are limited. 148 Likewise, in denying application of the odd-lot doctrine to the petitioner in Bradley,
the supreme court noted that he had a ninth grade education and had
served as both a platoon sergeant and drill instructor in the Air Force
during the Korean War. 1 49 By contrast, most odd-lot workers had
little or no education at all, and their experience was limited to
strictly manual labor of the unskilled variety. 150 Consequently, it
appears that the odd-lot doctrine would not apply to one whose education or experience would be able to provide him or her with the
15 1
ability to adapt to a different type of employment.
The second approach, the introduction of positive evidence of
employability, mandates that the employer demonstrate steady and
147 Id. at 346, 126 A.2d at 380. In addition, the court noted that Rodriguez's work record
demonstrated his willingness to work, regardless of how unpleasant the nature of the job. Id. at
354, 126 A.2d at 384.
14sOglesby, 64 N.J. at 541, 318 A.2d at 15 (total illiteracy, no education, and strictly manual
labor).
149 See Bradley, 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324. While both Bradley's and Oglesby's injuries
were similar, see Brief for Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 78, at 19-20, Bradley's military experience and education made him a more marketable competitor in the labor market. See Bradley, 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324.
150 Oglesby, 64 N.J. at 541, 318 A.2d at 15 (manual laborer with no education); Barbato, 64
N.J. at 520, 318 A.2d at 4 (manual laborer with fifth grade education); Quiles v. New Jersey
Metals Co., 37 N.J. 91, 97, 179 A.2d 393, 396 (1962) (unskilled laborer with sixth grade education); Crooms v. Central Steel Drum Co., 156 N.J. Super. 471, 473, 384 A.2d 155, 156 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 493, 391 A.2d 508 (1978) (manual laborer with minimal education);
Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 345-46, 126 A.2d at 380 (unskilled laborer with third grade education); Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 413, 307 A.2d at 142 (unskilled laborer with minimal education). But see Maier v. Township of Union, 155 N.J. Super. 467, 382 A.2d 1149 (App. Div.
1977) (odd-lot doctrine applied to an ex-police officer with a high school education who suffered
a heart attack).
151See Barbato, 64 N.J. at 528, 318 A.2d at 8. Justice Pashman has observed that it was for
the unskilled and uneducated laborer that the odd-lot doctrine was developed. Id. Louisiana has
specifically limited the odd-lot doctrine to unskilled workers. E.g., James v. Jake Tusa's Restaurant & Bar, 332 So. 2d 548, 549 (La. App. 1976); Bryant v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 318 So. 2d
379, 381 (La. App.), writ denied, 318 So. 2d 46 (1975); Kemp v. L. L. Brewton Lumber Co.,
168 So. 2d 911, 912-13 (La. App. 1964).
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uninterrupted work. 152 It appears likely that expert testimony would
be sufficient, whether the expertise be in medicine or employment
analysis. 1 53 One of the aims, however, of the odd-lot doctrine is to
delegate to the employer the obligation of finding employment for the
individual. M Therefore, the best evidence of employability is the
offer of employment to the individual or a referral to an employer
155
who is willing to hire him.
In the event that a respondent fails to make his case and total
disability is awarded, an employer may apply for a decrease in compensation should the employee's condition improve. 156 An employer
is, of course, also free to appeal the compensation court's decision. 157 The standard governing appellate review in an odd-lot case
is essentially the same standard as for an appeal from any nonjury
case. 158 As long as the findings of the trial court are based on sufficient credible evidence in the record, an appellate court must give
deference to the trial court's superior opportunity to observe the witnesses. 159 It is where the facts, as assessed by the trial court, are not
based on sufficient evidence, that an appellate court may intervene
160
and make additional fact findings.
CONCLUSION

Traditionally, the odd-lot doctrine may be said to comprise two
facets. The first includes a recognition of those non-medical factors
which affect employability. In this area, the New Jersey decisions
exemplify a willingness to accept a wide range of considerations. Appropriately, a marked flexibility has surfaced as to the determination
of whether an individual is unemployable. Furthermore, the concept
152 Kumpf, supra note 116, at 23. Professor Larson has suggested that evidence that the
petitioner had refused a position would also demonstrate employability. See A. LARSON, supra
note 3, § 57.66 at 10-161.

153 Kumpf, supra note 116, at 23; see Barbato, 64 N.J. at 520-21, 318 A.2d at 4. while the
employment expert in Barbato had testified for the petitioner, there appears to be no reason
why he could not testify for the employer. See id.
1 Lightner, 76 N.J. Super. at 468, 184 A.2d at 842-43; Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 412, 307
A.2d at 141.
155 See Zanchi, 124 N.J. Super. at 412, 307 A.2d at 141.
156 Germain, 70 N.J. at 9, 355 A.2d at 647; Rodriguez, 42 N.J. Super. at 355, 126 A.2d at
385; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-27 (West 1959) (petitions for decrease may be made at any
time following an award).
1'7 Appeals from the compensation court are heard by the Appellate Division. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-66 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
158 Close v. Kordulak, 44 N.J. 589, 598, 210 A.2d 753, 758 (1965).
159 Bradley, 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d 324; see Close v. Kordulak, 44 N.J. 589, 599, 210 A.2d

753, 758 (1965).

160 Close v. Kordulak, 44 N.J. 589, 599, 210 A.2d 753, 758 (1965).
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of unemployability has been examined in an abundance of decisions.
There are, therefore, strong precedents to guide a compensation
court in determining the weight and relevance of a particular circumstance related to a petitioner.
Bradley has been significant in this area because it establishes a
petitioner's motivation in seeking total disability as a relevant item in
assessing odd-lot status. While motivation should not become the ultimate issue in an odd-lot decision, it can serve to distinguish those
claimants whose goal is "to take a shot at" total disability from those
16 1
who are deserving of it.
The question of motivation is a relatively
uncharted area in New Jersey compensation law, and is quite susceptible to abuse. To avoid this problem, it is essential that the compensation judges continue to view the petitioner's condition in a flexible
manner.
It has been noted, however, that the compensation courts appear
"hesitan[t]" to apply the odd-lot doctrine.' 6 2 This hesitation may be
attributable to what was traditionally the second facet of the doctrine,
pursuant to which the burden of producing evidence of employability
shifts to the employer. While the Bradley decision denies giving this
burden of production the effect of a presumption, 16 3 Justice
Pashman's strong dissent indicates that there is formidable opposition
to the majority's view. From a practical standpoint, however, such
criticism may be unwarranted. 164 It is in the nature of an adversarial
proceeding that when the petitioner puts forth evidence as to an issue
in dispute, the respondent, in order to prevail, will attempt to rebut
that evidence. Where the petitioner's case is weak or susceptible to
credibility problems, as in Bradley, the respondent should be permitted to refrain from introducing evidence as to employability without
risking a peremptory finding against him. Although the respondent in
565

Kumpf, supra note 116, at 2.

182 Bradley, 164 N.J. Super. at 472, 397 A.2d at 338, modified, 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323

(1979).
163 See 78 N.J. at 534, 397 A.2d at 324.
'6 From a strictly legal standpoint, as well, it is questionable whether a presumption is
validly invoked. For a presumption to arise, there must be a basic fact and a presumed fact. See
McCoRiICK, supra note 40, at 803. Dean McCormick defined a presumption as "a standardized practice, under which certain facts [basic facts] are held to call for uniform treatment
with respect to their effect as proof of other [presumed] facts.'" Id. Assuming that in an odd-lot
case the presumed fact is unemployability, what are the basic facts? Unlike the presumption of
receipt of a mailed letter where the basic facts are a letter correctly addressed, the proper
postage, and the letter deposited in the mail, the basic facts of a presumption of unemployability encompass a myriad of varied factors, which may or may not coalesce to show unemployability. Compare C. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 132, at 602 with notes 119 & 120 supra.
Furthermore, any attempt to limit or closely define the factors relevant to a determination of
odd-lot status, would destroy the flexibility inherent in the application of the doctrine.
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this situation may ultimately fail, this result should come about because of the strength of the petitioner's case and not as a result of a
rule of law.
Mary Patricia Magee

